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Below the Line: Misrepresented Sources in the Rosenhan Hoax

Abstract

Though footnotes may seem like technicalities in the sciences, work in these disciplines is by no
means independent of textual sources. How often are sources checked? In the unique case of
D. L. Rosenhan’s celebrated—and as we now know, fabricated—study ‘On Being Sane in Insane
Places’, a review of any of several listed sources (or even an ordinarily attentive reading of the
text itself) would have suggested strongly that something was not right. Had readers examined
Rosenhan’s sources with ordinary care, so many misrepresentations would have been
uncovered that the credibility of the entire performance would have come into question. In the
absence of due diligence, serious abuses can, and in this instance did, go undetected for
decades. Regardless of the presumption that the humanities are tied to pre-existing texts as
the sciences are not, or even that the sciences free us from dependence on the past and its
works, the evaluation of published work will require the scrutiny of sources as long as sources
are used.

Visible But Ignored

Shadowing the medical and psychiatric literature is a body of information of unknown
magnitude consisting of clinical-trial data withheld from publication.1 Necessarily, this dark
matter is invisible to readers of the literature. However, certain information seems to possess a
degree of invisibility despite being part of the literature itself: footnotes. After all, it is not an
article’s sources but its findings, in particular its novel or striking findings, that solicit interest. A
long train of footnotes at the end of an article strikes us as tiresome, like a parade that lasts so
long that the spectators go home.
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To the impatient reader, footnotes in a discipline like medicine or psychiatry are at once
a tedious formality and a distraction from the page, and attaching importance to them may
seem like a great stir over very little, in the tradition of the private war between Gibbon and a
sniping critic over 383 references in two chapters of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.2
But neglect has its costs. As a result of the general disinclination to look into footnotes, an
article can sit squarely in the spotlight for years on end without irregularities in its use of source
material attracting notice. Almost a half century elapsed before two investigators discovered a
slew of misreported data in the article generally recognized as the foundation of the immense
literature on the placebo effect, Beecher’s ‘The Powerful Placebo’.3 A unique beneficiary of the
inattention to footnotes is D. L. Rosenhan’s famous exposé of incompetence and outright
inhumanity in American psychiatric hospitals, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’ (1973),4 to which
a series of references is attached like a certificate of authenticity. These references seem to
have been accepted at face value. Not even Rosenhan’s critics caught on to his distortion of
cited sources, beginning in the very first footnote.

Misrepresentations

Rosenhan’s stunning article appeared at a critical hour in the history of American
psychiatry. Not only was the reigning psychodynamic model under strong challenge, not only
was the American Psychiatric Association (APA) locked in a civil war over the diagnosis of
homosexuality,5 but the profession suffered damaging attacks on its legitimacy and credibility
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at the hands of persuasive critics. Of these attacks, Rosenhan’s article, published in no less a
journal than Science, stands out as certainly the most dramatic and potentially the most
devastating. Ironically enough, its sheer dangerousness made it politically useful to the figure
who would soon lead the APA’s effort to construct a new diagnostic system (to be known as
DSM-III): Robert Spitzer. Spitzer’s successor Allen Frances once remarked that if not for ‘On
Being Sane in Insane Places’, Spitzer ‘could never have done what he did with DSM-III’,6
implying that the existential threat to psychiatry posed by Rosenhan gave Spitzer what he
needed to rally the APA behind the cause of diagnostic reform.
An immediate cause célèbre, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’ recounts an experiment in
which eight sane individuals, including the author, presented at twelve psychiatric hospitals,
claiming to have heard voices say improbable things like ‘Thud’. Diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia in every case but one, they were held an average of 19 days despite giving no
sign of abnormality, and were treated with the utmost contempt. Such was the malign power
of the diagnostic label attached to the pseudo-patients (as Rosenhan calls them) that it
poisoned the perception and judgement of all concerned and remained attached for no other
reason than that it was applied in the first place. In Rosenhan’s telling, the real insanity lies in
the institution of the psychiatric hospital; hence the paper’s title. How odd, then, that he would
have us believe that ‘the administrator and the chief psychologist’ of one of these madhouses
colluded with him when he got himself admitted7—a detail that mirrors the 1952 report of an
anthropologist who indeed smuggled himself into a psychiatric hospital with the knowledge of
‘two members of the senior staff’,8 albeit not with the intention of hoaxing and shaming the
institution.
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It turns out that the Rosenhan hoax really was a hoax. In 2019 an investigator who
obtained Rosenhan’s notes and tracked down every lead concluded that no such study as the
one he reported ever took place.9 (Though Rosenhan did sham his way into Haverford State
Hospital in Pennsylvania under a false name, he told the doctor more than a thin story about
hearing voices: he alleged that he was ‘sensitive to radio signals and could hear what people are
thinking’,10 and that he put copper over his ears for his own protection, all of which makes the
diagnosis of schizophrenia much less casual than it appears in his paper.) By 2019, of course,
Rosenhan’s study had been legendary for so long that its falsehoods had become, for many,
conventional wisdom. But the honesty of ‘Insane Places’ could and should have been
questioned at the time. While few besides Spitzer seem to have suspected that Rosenhan’s
report was a fabrication, anyone who read it with ordinary care should have been able to see
that something was not right.
Though the study protocol supposedly had the pseudos ‘cease simulating any symptoms
of abnormality’ upon admission,11 in Rosenhan’s account they exhibited no outward symptoms
in the first place. They heard voices, but neither their speech nor behaviour was at all
disordered. (With great disingenuousness, Rosenhan later said that the study protocol called
for the volunteers to simulate one and only one symptom—auditory hallucinations—in order to
lessen the psychological demands on them.)12 The symptom of hearing voices was well chosen
as it accounts almost credibly for the reported fact that each and every pseudo was admitted,
even though public hospitals at the time actually admitted about only 40% of voluntary
patients, as documented by a source identified by Rosenhan as critical of his point of view;13
and all hospitals but one in the Rosenhan study were supposedly public. On the other hand,
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the normality of the pseudos’ speech and behaviour at the hospital door destroys Rosenhan’s
claim that the institutions failed in every instance to register a clear and obvious change of
demeanour once the volunteers were admitted. No change of demeanour occurred. The
argument of ‘Insane Places’ falls to the ground upon an ordinarily careful reading of its text.
If psychiatric hospitals were as wedded to their own preconceived notions as Rosenhan
and other exponents of labeling theory contend, it’s a wonder the volunteers were discharged
in less than three weeks, on average. Possibly Rosenhan wanted to convey the experience of
the many patients in such hospitals whose stay was brief, a group that actually made up the
majority at the time.14 But precisely because their stay was brief, the pseudos in ‘Insane Places’
simply do not have time to incur the worst of the alleged effects of labeling.
According to Rosenhan, the ultimate harm of diagnostic labels such as those supposedly
applied to the pseudos is that the patient over time comes to internalize them and even live
them out. As he says, ‘Eventually, the patient himself accepts the diagnosis, with all of its
surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves accordingly’.15 Not once in ‘Insane Places’ is
this ominous process borne out. Not the pseudo-patient held for 52 days, not one of the seven
or eight discharged with a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia in remission’ (as if the disease were
dangling over their heads, ready to strike at any time), not even the long-term patients among
whom the pseudos were housed are ever shown acting out the disorder they have been labeled
with. Just as the behaviour of the pseudos does not support the argument that the staff’s
perception was distorted by the label affixed to them, so the behaviour of one and all fails to
illustrate the power of labels over patients. In both cases the text of ‘Insane Places’ clearly fails
to support its own polemic.
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On what, then, does Rosenhan rest the audacious claim that a diagnosis once imposed
becomes the patient’s fate? On one of the cardinal works of the anti-psychiatry movement,
Scheff’s Being Mentally Ill.16
The sentence ‘Eventually, the patient himself accepts the diagnosis, with all of its
surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves accordingly’ is footnoted, with the following
reference:

T. J. Scheff, Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory (Aldine, Chicago, 1966)

Note the subtitle. Rosenhan validates what he presents as a statement of fact by referring to a
theory. But a theory can’t validate a statement of fact, still less such an expansive claim as that
a psychiatric label will inevitably realise itself at the patient’s expense. Evidently Rosenhan
didn’t really see the need to verify the theory of labeling, since as we now know he never
actually conducted the study recounted in the pages of Science.
The reader who advances beyond the subtitle of Scheff’s monograph will find that after
discussing the power of psychiatric labels to shape behaviour, colour the patient’s selfconception, and lock in deviations from the norm, the author progressively qualifies his claims
until little is left—certainly not enough to serve as a foundation for a principle of inevitability.
Thus, on p. 101 of the edition of Being Mentally Ill cited by Rosenhan, in the Conclusion of the
study’s central chapter, Scheff concedes that ‘many of the hypotheses suggested are largely
unverified’, and on p. 152 he summarizes the state of the evidence as follows: ‘There is some
evidence that too hasty exposure to psychiatric treatment may convince the patient that he is
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“sick,” prolonging what might have been an otherwise transitory episode’. One qualifier is piled
on another: ‘some’; ‘too hasty’; ‘may’; ‘might have been’. Far from supporting the law that the
label inevitably crushes the patient, Scheff’s evidence is too weak to support anything.
If it’s possible to dilute even further a claim already so attenuated, Scheff does just that
in his monograph’s Conclusion. Writing of himself in the third person, he encapsulates his case
for the labeling theory as follows:

Acknowledging that the evidence was far from complete, both in amount and quality,
the author concluded that the existing state of evidence favored this sociological theory,
perhaps only slightly . . . Obviously the author is predisposed to accept the theory, and
may not have been sufficiently impartial in his selection and evaluation of the evidence.
Other investigators, more objective than the author, might review the state of evidence
and come to a contrary conclusion.17

As if conscience-stricken, Scheff concludes the case for his theory with a sort of apology for the
theory itself. Reviewing Being Mentally Ill in 1968, Rosenhan noted that it propounds ‘a theory
in terms of nine testable propositions’, neglected to note the state of the evidence, and praised
the author for ‘preferring the modest to the flamboyant statement’.18 In ‘Insane Places’
Rosenhan prefers the flamboyant to the modest, conceals Scheff’s qualifiers and disclaimers,
cites his theory as if it had the status of a law, and reports his own study as a confirmation of
the theory even though it bears out not at all the baleful effect of diagnosis on patients, no
matter whether they are held indefinitely in an ‘insane’ institution or have a suggestive
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diagnosis like ‘schizophrenia in remission’ impending over them like an ill omen. Scheff squared
the circle in 1974 by holding up the Rosenhan study as strong corroboration of his theory of the
social origin of mental illness.19
Scenting fraud in ‘Insane Places’, Spitzer answered the allegation of wholesale
misdiagnosis with a study of his own, refusing to conceal the identity of the hospitals he put to
the test and implicitly challenging Rosenhan—in a footnote—to do the same.20 Once Spitzer
came into possession of medical records proving the dishonesty of Rosenhan’s anonymized
account of his own admission into Haverford State Hospital, he could have exposed Rosenhan
at any time. For reasons of his own he kept the secret. But just as anyone who reads ‘Insane
Places’ with ordinary care can see that it does not support its own allegation that the unnamed
hospitals failed to notice an obvious change in the pseudo-patients’ behaviour upon admission,
so any reader who follows up on Rosenhan’s citation of Scheff catches on to his opportunistic
use of the latter’s text. The evidence in this instance is not confidential but in the public
domain.
Nor does Rosenhan confine his unscrupulous handling of source material to Scheff. He
abuses sources right and left—so many that it’s a wonder that none of the cited authors seem
to have cried foul.
In defense of the proposition that the mentally ill are ‘society’s lepers’,21 Rosenhan cites
a 1970 article by Sarbin and Mancuso which, as it happens, strongly implies that the allegedly
intolerant general public would see no reason to hospitalize someone who behaves as
innocuously as the pseudo-patients in ‘Insane Places’. ‘The survey data have shown repeatedly
that only persons who exhibit the most exaggerated deviations will be regarded as mentally ill,
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and even when this is done, the general public only infrequently makes the recommendation
that such persons be hospitalized’.22 So much for the notion that society demands the
sequestration of the mentally ill in the psychiatric equivalent of a leper colony. Another of
Rosenhan’s cited sources disputes the cliché of public abhorrence of the mentally ill, reporting
that 50% of respondents ‘could imagine themselves falling in love with someone who had been
mentally ill’, 81% ‘wouldn’t hesitate to work with someone who had been mentally ill’, 85%
agreed that ‘people who have some kinds of mental illness can be taken care of at home’, and
60% agreed that ‘people who have been in a state mental hospital are no more likely to commit
crimes than people who have never been in a state mental hospital’.23 Predicated as they are
on the impermanence of mental illness (‘someone who had been mentally ill’), several of these
responses belie Rosenhan’s contention that the public believes mental illness ‘endures
forever’.24 Doubly suspect is Rosenhan’s suggestion that just as, or perhaps even because, the
public allows its response to the mentally ill to be dictated by their label, so do those in charge
of mental hospitals.
Also cited by Rosenhan is a 1965 study by Farina and Ring testing the theory that the
mentally ill person is ‘a prisoner of his own reputation’, very much like the admitted pseudos
who find themselves treated as insane despite behaving perfectly normally. (As Farina and Ring
say, the prejudice against the mentally ill ‘can color the perception of a person believed to be
mentally ill even when his behavior is, by all objective standards, “normal”’.)25 Following this
build-up, the authors report an experiment in which paired undergraduate psychology
students, one of them falsely identified as having a history of mental illness, play a child’s game
that involves rolling a ball through a maze. The experiment itself—literally child’s play—is so
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obviously out of keeping with ominous themes like the victimization of the mentally ill that the
authors concede that it could be considered ‘superficial’.26 It hardly bears the weight assigned
to it by Rosenhan. And one wonders why, if the pseudos were ‘prisoners’ of others’ entrenched
misconceptions, they were released.
In connection with the issue of the arbitrariness of psychiatric categories, Rosenhan
cites, among other sources, an article by Derek Phillips that has nothing to do with that topic
and does not even mention psychiatric diagnosis.27 After making the provocative claim that
diagnosed psychiatric patients are condemned to live out their label, Rosenhan returns to the
theme of arbitrariness, referring to an article by Zigler and Leslie Phillips said to demonstrate
that ‘there is an enormous overlap in the symptoms presented by patients who have been
variously diagnosed’28: a point which, in turn, has nothing to do with the topic of noxious
diagnoses. Rosenhan does not note that the article in question (‘Psychiatric Diagnosis: A
Critique’) censures the excesses of labeling theory, in particular the indiscriminate rejection of
psychiatric categories.29 In direct opposition to Rosenhan, the authors defend the principle of
psychiatric classification. They do not consider the diagnosis of schizophrenia (for example) a
meaningless but highly prejudicial tag, as in ‘Insane Places’; on the contrary, they observe that
by carefully delineating symptoms one can distinguish ‘those schizophrenics with good
prognosis’ from ‘those with poor prognosis’.30 It is hard to know why Rosenhan mentions Zigler
and Phillips other than to project an appearance of scholarship or perhaps make a tactical
retreat from a sensational claim about the power of labels for which he can offer no support
even in a piece of fiction.
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However, by mentioning Zigler and Phillips as if they somehow corroborated his
polemic, Rosenhan opens himself to the charge of using sources dishonestly. It is not just that
he obscures the authors’ thoughtful analysis of psychiatric classification. The fact is that the
same authors, in the same year, in the same journal offer evidence against the inflammatory
thesis that labels themselves dictate the outcome of cases. They do so by showing a correlation
between clinical outcome and maturity or social competence.31 Rosenhan’s non-mention of
the latter article, even as he misleadingly cites its companion, exemplifies the dishonest
handling of sources in ‘Insane Places’—a practice that should have called his article into
question decades before he was exposed as an academic trickster.
Following the publication of ‘Insane Places’, Rosenhan went on to test the limits of
audacity by toying with an identified source. In a retrospective comment on the controversy he
incited, he noted that he and his confederates were not the first to study a psychiatric hospital
covertly from within. In what now looks like a private joke, he wrote,

More than two decades earlier, Caudill (1958; Caudill, Redlich, Gilmore, & Brody, 1952),
had spent considerable time in a psychiatric hospital simulating a florid pattern of
symptomology throughout. He was consumed with guilt over deceiving his colleagues
and his report of his experiences was an excruciating warning to subsequent scientific
generations that such elaborate deceptions can have enormous personal
consequences.32
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As brief as it is, this statement abounds with misrepresentations and concealments. In the
investigation reported in the 1952 article, Caudill spent two months undercover in a psychiatric
hospital with the permission of two administrators,33 unlike all of Rosenhan’s supposed
confederates. (While Rosenhan could have answered his critics by reiterating that he too had
authorization for impersonating a patient, something evidently deterred him from repeating
this rather bold lie.) Caudill did not simulate his way through the door. His intent was not to
expose the insanity of the institution but to learn about the patients’ behaviour with one
another, especially their group dynamics. According to the circumstantial account given in the
1952 article, inside the hospital Caudill exhibited no florid symptoms, unless playing bridge falls
into that category. Dissatisfied with the results of this covert exercise, Caudill undertook a
lengthier study in 1952-53 in propria persona, not as a pseudo-patient. Though he did come to
feel that the price of conducting undercover research was ‘too high’,34 he did not suggest that
anyone following in his footsteps should take care to fake only a single symptom (as Rosenhan
purports), still less that someone brave enough to shoulder an enormous burden of guilt can
reveal the inner workings of a psychiatric hospital as no one else can.
Three investigators who refer to Caudill present their own undercover experiences in a
1970 article cited in ‘Insane Places’.35 It seems curious that Rosenhan’s account of the ordeal of
confinement bears only a vague resemblance to theirs, which underlines the ‘fear of betrayal’
that seizes the admitted patient, the ‘agitated boredom’ that sets in, and an elaborate
exchange system serving to condition the inmate to his or her surroundings. If Rosenhan and
his confederates had been overcome with a virtually paranoid fear upon admission, or had
exhibited constant agitation, or had even adapted to a humiliating system of petty barter, it
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would have been much more difficult to maintain that their behaviour was nothing short of
perfectly normal.

Due Diligence

The Rosenhan experiment of course never took place, but if it had, its originality would
have consisted in the author’s appropriation of the Caudill precedent and clever use of labeling
theory. In other words, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’ is thoroughly enmeshed in the existing
literature; and this being so, its use of sources could and should have been investigated by its
readers, especially its critics.
Some of Rosenhan’s readers may have assumed that his exposé had already been
source-checked (it appeared in Science, after all) or that inspecting footnotes may befit a
backward-looking discipline but not an advancing one. But regardless of the presumption that
the humanities are tied to pre-existing texts as the sciences aren’t, or even that the sciences
free us from dependence on the past and its works, the evaluation of literature will require the
scrutiny of sources as long as it uses them. And the review of sources in a medical or
psychiatric or social-scientific paper calls for the same sort of care required by the evaluation of
textual evidence wherever else it is found.
While a reader confronted with a lengthy list of references may scarcely know where
to begin, a good place to start might be the first entry. The first footnote in ‘Insane Places’
attaches to the statement, ‘More generally, there are a great deal of conflicting data on the
reliability, utility, and meaning of such terms as “sanity”, “insanity”, “mental illness”, and
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“schizophrenia”’. The note itself refers the reader to two comprehensive reviews, one
published in 1967, one in 1971, neither of which happens to mention sanity or insanity.36
Readers might also investigate evidentiary support for an article’s more ambitious claims. In
support of the claim that the labeled patient will inevitably internalise and even live out his or
her diagnosis, Rosenhan, as we know, directs the reader to a work of theory offering highly
qualified support for the claim itself. (While all other footnotes are numbered consecutively in
the text of ‘Insane Places’, the Scheff note appears between numbers 15 and 16 even though it
is number 5.) If readers had looked into Scheff’s Being Mentally Ill, which finds in the end only
an equivocal preponderance of evidence in favour of labeling theory, they might have marveled
that Rosenhan found this theory confirmed each and every time he tested it: twelve times out
of twelve. How flawlessly he replicated his own results! Even as social science, like the medical
literature, came to confront its replication problem, ‘Insane Places’, with its improbable success
rate stood decade after decade until at last it was exposed as a sham. It need not have stood so
long.
If Rosenhan actually believed that by invoking the theory of the cold mother as the
cause of schizophrenia, psychiatrists can somehow make a normal person become
schizophrenic, he shows no such metamorphosis in ‘Insane Places’. The discussion of the coldmother theory does, however, lead to his claim that patients are destined to live their
diagnosis, and attached to the discussion is a footnote about the power of self-fulfilling labels:
note 15.37 The reader who follows up on the reference to Scheff comes to see that it similarly
masks an inability to offer evidence of any kind in favour of the proposition that labeled
patients will ‘eventually’ live their label. The reader who follows up on the rather ostentatious
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reference to Gove’s critique of labeling theory in footnote 3 of ‘Insane Places’ may begin to
wonder about a study in which each and every patient presenting at the door of a public
hospital gains admission: another success rate of 100%. A reader whose attention is caught by
two sources coincidentally named Phillips finds that Rosenhan misrepresents both, albeit in
dissimilar ways. Similarly, by placing himself in the Caudill tradition of the surreptitious
observer, Rosenhan invites a review of what Caudill actually said. It is much as if Rosenhan
enjoyed flirting with danger by citing one work after another that does not fit his text. If he had
planted clues that his study was a hoax, he could hardly have given better ones than some of
his footnotes. Unfortunately, readers were too distracted with the drama of the pseudopatients (so convincingly rendered by Rosenhan) to concern themselves with cited sources.
Even Spitzer’s cogent refutation of Rosenhan leaves the issue of abused sources untouched
while subtly hinting at the author’s dishonesty.38
A chapter of Susannah Cahalan’s investigation of ‘Insane Places’ looks into its sixth
footnote, a particularly cunning aside in which Rosenhan professes to have omitted the data of
one pseudo-patient in the interest of his study’s integrity. (The title of the chapter is ‘The
Footnote’.) Of course, the exposure of the Rosenhan study as a fabrication 50 years after the
fact could not undo the damage that had been done over the decades when it stood as an
electrifying demonstration of the evils of psychiatry in general, and psychiatric labels in
particular. Given that Spitzer chose to protect Rosenhan’s secret, probably nothing but the
unmasking of Rosenhan’s practice of misrepresentation could have prevented ‘On Being Sane in
Insane Places’ from being canonised. And to establish Rosenhan’s malpractice, all that was
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necessary was due diligence. Readers need only have investigated with ordinary care the first
of his footnotes, or the reference to Scheff immediately preceding note 6, or the spurious
citation of Crocetti and Lemkau in note 3 or Zigler and Phillips in note 16 or Sarbin and Mancuso
in note 19, or even the reference to Caudill after ‘Insane Places’ was published. All of these
misrepresentations are glaring—and no tradition decrees that gentlemen don’t open each
other’s footnotes.
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